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Abstract : We develop a model of trade and agglomeration that incorporates trade in both
intermediate goods and final goods and allows all firms to choose their locations. There are
two types of labor: skilled labor, which is mobile, and unskilled labor, which is immobile.
Upon choosing its factory site, a final goods firm that is managed by skilled labor can pro-
duce these goods using local unskilled labor and a variety of intermediate goods produced by
productivity-heterogeneous producers. We characterize world equilibrium and establish the
conditions under which industrial agglomeration arises as a stable equilibrium outcome. We
show that when the unskilled labor force is small, the role played by the selection of inter-
mediate firms becomes less important, and trade liberalization induces dispersion. When the
unskilled labor force is large and the selection eﬀect becomes influential, trade liberalization
can generate non-monotonic eﬀects on industrial agglomeration. The dispersion eﬀect of
trade liberalization arises when unskilled labor-intermediate input complementarity matters
to firm selection to a greater degree. When this is the case, trade liberalization may induce
less selective firm entry and cause average productivity to fall.
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1 Introduction
During the past few decades of global economic development, there has been an ongoing in-
crease in production fragmentation and intermediate goods trade.1 This globalization trend
has been accompanied by the rise of several key “world factories” that assemble a variety of
final products, including Japan and the smaller, rapidly growing Asian Tigers. More recent
years have seen the rapid clustering of manufacturing in China, turning that country into the
world’s factory. The overall process has prompted considerable concern over the hollowing-
out of domestic industries, starting with the more advanced Japanese economy and followed
by the more recently developed Asian Tigers. How does trade liberalization factor into this
process? It is generally believed that a reduction in trade costs will promote agglomeration,
either international or regional (e.g., see Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse [2002] on interna-
tional agglomeration and Behrens and Robert-Nicoud [2011] on regional agglomeration). Yet,
if trade liberalization does increase the incentives for firms to agglomerate in China, and if
other countries are concerned about industrial hollowing-out, then why would these countries
want to sign trade agreements with China, thereby risking the loss of firms to China?2
In this paper, we revisit this important issue employing a model of trade and agglomera-
tion that incorporates trade in both intermediate goods and final goods and allows all firms
to choose their locations. There are two types of labor in the model, one skilled and mobile
and the other unskilled and immobile. The skilled labor force comprises final goods managers
who choose among countries in determining where to locate their firms. Upon its factory site
is determined, each final goods firm produces these goods using local unskilled labor and a
variety of intermediate goods produced by heterogeneous producers that diﬀer in terms of
productivity. Whereas the intermediate inputs enter production via a quadratic aggregator,
as proposed by Peng, Thisse, and Wang (2006), intermediate inputs and unskilled labor are
complements in assembling the final good, as in Krugman and Venables (1995) and Fujita,
Krugman, and Venables (1999). Importantly, because the unskilled labor force is immobile,
this complementarity becomes a dispersion force. To see how it does so, imagine that the
complementarity is significant and all final goods firms are located in one of two countries.
Because the other country has an unskilled labor force that is completely unemployed due
to its immobility, the wage there is nearly zero. Such a low wage is likely to induce some
1For example, see Jones (2000) and Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001).
2Such agreements include the pact signed by the ASEAN Plus 2, the Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA) with Taiwan, and the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Hong Kong.
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final goods firms to relocate to this country because its production will increase due to the
complementarity and the extremely low labor cost.
In this model economy, we establish a world equilibrium in which all final and interme-
diate goods producers optimize, and the locations of all firms are determined endogenously.
We are particularly interested in establishing the conditions under which industrial agglom-
eration arises as a stable equilibrium outcome. We show that, given the distribution of final
goods firms across countries, trade liberalization renders the selection of intermediate goods
firms tougher, and hence improves average productivity. A larger market size yields a similar
selection outcome. When the unskilled labor force is small, the selection eﬀect is less impor-
tant and trade liberalization induces dispersion, as in the intermediate goods trade model
proposed by Peng, Thisse, and Wang (2006), but in contrast to the final goods trade model
posited by Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002). When the unskilled labor force is large,
the selection eﬀect is essential and trade liberalization can exert non-monotonic eﬀects on
industrial agglomeration. When this is the case, and when unskilled labor-intermediate input
complementarity matters to a relatively greater degree, such complementarity can interact
with firm selection such that trade liberalization encourages dispersion, which is contrary to
general belief. Moreover, in this case, trade liberalization may induce less selective firm entry
and cause average productivity to fall. Using numerical analysis, we illustrate much richer
equilibrium configurations than those obtained in the trade and new economic geography
literature.
By adopting the firm heterogeneity structure proposed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
our model reveals a new and interesting channel to characterize the relationship between
firm selection and agglomeration. In particular, the aforementioned non-monotonic eﬀect of
trade costs on industrial agglomeration stems from the fact that trade costs, as a parameter
determining selection pressure, can be both conducive and detrimental to agglomeration. As
we explain this in greater detail in Section 4, we simply oﬀer a quick intuition here. Lower
trade costs imply a larger eﬀective market size, and hence tougher selection. As agglomeration
induces productivity gains via selection, tougher selection implies greater gains. However, as
selection pressure is readily tough with a lower trade cost, a marginal increase in selection
pressure via agglomeration is less pronounced. Thus, the marginal gains from agglomeration,
i.e., the incentives to agglomerate, are less with a lower trade cost, and trade liberalization
may thus lead to dispersion. Which force dominates depends.
Related Literature
Our paper is generally related to two strands of economic studies. The first strand em-
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beds firm heterogeneity in the study of international trade (cf. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen
and Kortum, 2003; Melitz, 2003). The second investigates agglomeration internationally or
regionally, and encompasses the new economic geography literature (cf. Fujita, Krugman,
and Venables, 1999; Fujita, Krugman, and Mori, 1999). Several recent works have combined
the two strands to investigate spatial sorting (Baldwin and Okubo, 2006; Behrens, Duranton,
and Robert-Nicoud, 2010), economic agglomeration (Behrens and Robert-Nicoud, 2011), and
productivity gains across cities (Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, and Roux, 2009).
The non-monotonic relationship between trade costs and agglomeration lies at the center
of our analysis. Although Krugman and Venables (1995) propose an agglomeration model
with homogeneous firms that generates a similar non-monotonic relationship, our model of
heterogeneous firms provides a new and interesting angle to this relationship, as explained
earlier. It is also interesting to compare our model with that in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
Their model features selection but not agglomeration. Furthermore, trade liberalization al-
ways leads to greater productivity, which is not necessarily the case in our model. Particularly
in the case in which trade liberalization leads to dispersion, selection pressure is eased, and
the average productivity may become lower.
As we employ a quadratic rather than the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier aggregator, our paper
is also closely related to Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002), Peng, Thisse, and Wang
(2006), and Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2011). In contrast to all of these but Peng, Thisse,
and Wang (2006), we apply the quadratic structure to final goods production rather than to
household utility. In contrast to Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) and Peng, Thisse,
and Wang (2006), we allow for firm heterogeneity and consider selection of intermediate
producers. In contrast to all previous works, we incorporate a new feature, i.e., the dispersion
force that results from the complementarity between immobile unskilled workers and tradable
intermediate inputs in final goods assembly. This dispersion force diﬀers from the oft-used
example of agriculture produced by an immobile factor such as land/farmers (e.g., Krugman,
1991; Fujita and Krugman, 1995; Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse, 2002) or an immobile
consumable such as land or an amenity (e.g., Helpman, 1998; Redding and Sturm, 2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
examines equilibrium given the distribution of skilled labor. Section 3 solves the optimization
problems facing final goods producers, intermediate firms, and skilled labor. Section 4 out-
lines the equilibrium conditions and defines the concept of world equilibrium. In Section 5,
we characterize equilibrium outcomes, focusing on how trade liberalization aﬀects industrial
agglomeration. In Section 6, we present numerical results that highlight the diﬀerent agglom-
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eration features from those exhibited by models that employ either agriculture or immobile
land as the dispersion forces. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and provides possible
avenues for extension.
2 The Model
There are two ex ante identical countries, labeled  =  In each country, there are 
unskilled workers who are immobile and  skilled workers who are freely mobile across
countries. There are two types of goods: a homogeneous final good and a continuum of
diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. Both unskilled labor and intermediate goods are used to
produce the final good. The market for the final good is perfectly competitive, whereas
those for the intermediate goods are monopolistically competitive. These market structure
assumptions are analytically friendly benchmarks that are commonly used in the literature,
following the lead of Ethier (1982) and Romer (1990). Moreover, as documented in previous
studies, the intensity of the intermediate goods trade as measured by the VS index rose from
below 2% in the 1960s to over 15% in the 1990s (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001) whereas
the share of that trade has exceeded two-thirds (Yi, 2003). Thus, by placing emphasis
on both intermediate goods production and trade, our model addresses issues of increasing
importance.
The production of any intermediate good  requires a constant marginal cost in terms of
the final good, and can vary across firms. After paying a fixed input of  units of a final
good, an entrant obtains a “new” intermediate good blueprint with productivity , which
is a random realization from a Pareto distribution with lower bound  , i.e., Pr [ ≥ ] =
()− for all  ≥  . This implies that the distribution of marginal cost  = 1 is given
by
() ≡ Pr
∙
1
 ≤ 
¸
= Pr
∙
 ≥ 1
¸
=
µ 

¶
 for  ∈ (0  ], (1)
where  ≡ 1 is the upper bound of the marginal cost corresponding to the lower bound
of productivity  . Intermediate goods are tradable, but subject to an iceberg trade cost if
trade occurs across borders. More specifically, to deliver one unit of an intermediate good
across borders,   1 units need to be shipped.
The set of intermediate goods available in country  is given by £0  ¤  where   is
endogenously determined. Any skilled worker in , as the manager of a final goods firm, can
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produce a final good of  1 amount using the following technology:
 1 = 1 ln
¡1¢  (2)
1 = 
Z  
0
1() − 2
Z  
0
£1()¤2  − 2
ÃZ  
0
1()
!2
,
where 1() is the amount of intermediate good  employed, and 1 is the mass of unskilled
labor hired. We assume that   0 and   0, where the former is a typical scaling factor and
the latter measures the variety eﬀect of the intermediate good inputs. These intermediate
goods are Pareto substitutes (resp., complements) if   (resp., ) 0. To be compatible with
previous studies, inclusive of the new economic geography literature, we restrict our analysis
to the case of   0. The final good can be freely traded across countries, and is chosen as
the numeraire.
Skilled workers, as managers of final goods firms, choose their respective locations for
production. Let  ∈ (0 1) be the fraction of skilled workers located in . Thus,   =  ,
and the population identity requires
 +  = 1 (3)
Let  and  denote the wage of the unskilled labor force and the profit of a final goods firm
in country  respectively. The utility of an unskilled and skilled worker is thus  and 
respectively.3
Note that the production technology for the final good is modified from the quadratic
production function used by Peng, Thisse, and Wang (2006) by adding a multiplicative
term in unskilled labor. This modification allows us to capture the complementarity be-
tween unskilled labor and intermediate goods in final goods production. More specifically,
2 1
111 =
1
1  0, which implies that unskilled labor and intermediate good inputs are Pareto
complements. We will demonstrate that such complementarity plays an important role in
the equilibrium outcomes of agglomeration across countries.
3For tractability, we assume away the managerial need for intermediate goods firms. Nevertheless, the
endogenous entry decisions of the intermediate goods sector allow the agglomeration of intermediate goods
firms (as a larger entry) to go hand-in-hand with the agglomeration of final good firms.
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3 Optimization
We begin by solving a final goods firm’s optimization problem in given country , followed
by an intermediate firm’s optimization decision and then a skilled worker’s locational choice.
3.1 Final Goods Sector
Let () be the price of intermediate good  facing a final goods firm in country , whose
optimization problem is given by
max11()  = 1 ln
¡1¢− R  0 ()1() − 1
s.t. 1 = 
R  
0
1() − 2
R  
0
£1()¤2  − 2 ³R  0 1()´2  (4)
The first-order condition with respect to the number of unskilled workers hired, 1, is simply
1 = 

1
  (5)
The first-order condition with respect to intermediate good  takes a nice linear form:
 () = 
h
−  e1 − 1()i  (6)
where  ≡ ln ¡1¢ measures the marginal product of the intermediate inputs, and e1 ≡R  
0
1() is the aggregate demand for intermediate inputs. The latter condition equates
the marginal product of an intermediate input  with its price.
Before examining the location choices of the final goods firms and the intermediate goods
sector, we first observe that, in equilibrium, labor market clearing requires that
 = ln ¡1¢ = lnµ 
¶

To ensure positive output  1 , we impose the condition that    . Given a fixed mass of
skilled workers (final goods firms), the size of the unskilled labor force exerts a positive eﬀect
on the marginal product of intermediate inputs and, hence, intermediate goods demand, as a
result of Pareto complementarity. When, in contrast, when there are more final goods firms
competing for a fixed amount of unskilled labor (higher ), each firm hires fewer workers
and the marginal product of intermediate inputs is reduced.
Rearranging (6), we obtain a final goods firm’s demand for intermediate good :
1() = − 
e1
 −
()
  (7)
6
>From the foregoing equation and the definition of e1, we can solve the aggregate interme-
diate good demand: e1 =   +   −   +   ¯ 
which can then be substituted into (7) to yield
1() =  + 
¯
 ( +  ) −
()
 
or, equivalently, the inverse demand function for intermediate good :
 () = max − 1() (8)
where max ≡ + ¯+  is the price below which the quantity demanded is nonnegative and
¯ is the average price of intermediate goods that prevails. The maximum price increases
with both the average price and the number of unskilled workers employed in the final goods
sector.
3.2 Intermediate Goods Sector
Because intermediate goods firms are monopolists in their respective varieties, they can set
their own prices. An intermediate goods firm in  with marginal production cost  can sell to
domestic final goods firms or export to foreign final goods firms in country  6= . Utilizing
the inverse demand function (8), its profit from domestic sales (denoted by ) is
() = max()
£()− ¤  ¡max −  ()¢  (9)
whereas its profit from export sales (denoted by ) is
() = max()
£()− ¤  ¡max −  ()¢  (10)
The first-order conditions are:
() = 

max + 
2

() = 

max + 
2

Consider a marginal intermediate goods firm in  with  =  ≡ max, whose optimal price is
max and quantity sold is zero. Thus, any firms with    must exit, whereas those with
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   can remain in operation and sell to domestic final goods firms. Similarly, defining
 ≡ max , any firms in  with    will not find exporting to be profitable.
The foregoing conditions can be more intuitively written as
() = 
 + 
2
 () = 
 + 
2
 (11)
which can be substituted into (8), (9) and (10) to derive
() = 

2
¡ − ¢  () = 2 ¡ − ¢  (12)
() = 

4
¡ − ¢2  () =  24 ¡ − ¢2  (13)
Note that () is the market demand from final goods firms in country  for an intermediate
good produced in country  with marginal cost This firmwith  in country  needs to produce
and ship () units to country  and () will actually arrive.
3.3 Skilled Workers
To derive the profit of a final goods firm, which is the return of a skilled worker, we first
solve its value under autarky (i.e., with an infinitely large trade cost  such that there is
no trade in intermediate goods). Subsequently, we verify that even with intermediate goods
trade, such a functional form continues to hold true. More specifically, in the absence of
intermediate goods trade, the intermediate goods aggregator is given by (see the appendix
for a more detailed derivation):
1 = 
Z  
0
1() − 2
Z  
0
£1()¤2  − 2
ÃZ  
0
1()
!2
=
 − 

∙
2
+
( + 1) 
2 ( + 2)
¸
 (14)
A final goods firm’s profit  is given by (again, see the appendix for a more detailed deriva-
tion):
 = 1 −
Z  
0
()1() − 1
=
 − 
2
"
 ¡ − 1¢− ( + 1) ¡ + 1¢ 
( + 2) 
#
 (15)
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We now turn to the general case with intermediate goods trade (a finite ). As Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008) show, price distribution of goods sold by foreign firms actually matches
that of those sold by domestic firms. This is the case because of the Pareto assumption, and
also holds true in this paper. Accordingly, inspecting (8), we can see that the distribution
of the quantity demanded 1 () is also the same regardless of whether  is purchased from
a domestic or foreign firm, which implies that the formula for 1 in the general case is the
same as (14), except that   and  take diﬀerent values from the case with an infinite  .
Because we consider a homogeneous final good that can be freely traded across countries
and is the numeraire, nominal and real profits are identical in our model economy. The
locational choice of a final goods firm managed by a skilled worker is therefore given by
∗ = arg max∈{}
©ª  (16)
4 Equilibrium
We are now ready to define a competitive world equilibrium. We begin by describing several
key equilibrium conditions, followed by market clearing conditions.
4.1 Zero Cutoﬀ Profit
An important implication of the matching price distribution property discussed in the pre-
vious section is that, to derive the average price ¯, we need only consider the prices charged
by domestic firms:
¯ = 1 ¡¢
Z 
0
() () = 2 + 12 + 2
 (17)
Plugging (17) into the definition of max and utilizing  = ln ()− ln
¡¢, we obtain the
zero cutoﬀ profit (ZCP) condition:
  = 2 ( + 1) 
 £ln ()− ln ¡¢¤− 
  (18)
This ZCP condition posits a negative relationship between the cutoﬀ  and the number of
intermediate firms selling to ,  , under a given distribution of skilled workers. In other
words, when the measure of intermediate goods competing in the same market is larger, the
cutoﬀ is smaller (i.e., tougher selection).
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4.2 Free Entry of Intermediate Goods Firms
We next turn to the free entry conditions faced by intermediate goods firms, which requires
the expected operating profit to be equal to the entry cost (see the appendix):
 = ()(()|  ) +()(()|  ) (19)
=

2 ( + 1) ( + 2) ()
∙

¡¢+2 + − ¡¢+2
¸

Define  ≡ 2(+1)(+2)( )
(1+−) , which rises with both transport cost  and the strength of
variety eﬀect . Solving the system of equations in (19) for  =  and utilizing (18), we
can then determine the cutoﬀ:¡¢+2 =   =  ln ()− ln
¡¢
  (20)
This marginal-cost cutoﬀ is decreasing in , because a larger final goods market (higher
) renders the selection of intermediate goods firms tougher (lower ). Under a given
distribution of skilled labor, cutoﬀ  grows larger the greater the size of the unskilled labor
force (higher ), the higher the transport cost  (larger ), or the stronger the variety eﬀect
 (larger ).
It should be noted that entry and cutoﬀs are two sides of the same coin. In a firm
heterogeneity model such as this, the cutoﬀs summarize the key information of the model.
The only diﬀerences with the cutoﬀ formula in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) are that they
have  = 1 and  is exogenous. Let us now examine this formula more carefully. Cutoﬀs
depend on the underlying technology of the intermediate sector, which is captured by 
and   They also depend on the cost of entry, which is represented by  Naturally, the
demand side matters, which is why ,  and  enters. If  is large, then the love of
variety eﬀect is stronger, which makes selection easier, all else being equal. With regard
to the other parameters,  is simply the “market size eﬀect” emphasized by Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008). With a larger market size, the entry becomes larger and hence selection
becomes tougher. Now,  is a new element, indicating that the greater the number of workers
employed per final goods firm in , the larger the marginal product of intermediate goods in
producing the final good. Hence, a larger  increases the demand for intermediate goods,
thus rendering selection less tough. Evidently, although a high  has a direct impact on
selection, it also renders intermediate firm entry more selective via a reduction in unskilled
employment per firm. Finally,  matters in a way similar to market size. In fact, the larger
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 is, the smaller the eﬀective market size. Thus, trade liberalization that reduces  increases
the eﬀective market size and renders selection tougher.
Substituting (20) into (15), we obtain
 = −
¡¢−+1+2 ¡¢ 1+2
2
⎡
⎣ ¡ − 1¢− ( + 1) ¡ + 1¢ ¡¢−+1+2 ¡¢ 1+2 + 2
⎤
⎦  (21)
where  = ln () − ln ¡¢ is decreasing in . From (15), we know that  is strictly
decreasing in , and thus tougher selection always generates productivity gains. Because a
larger market size induces tougher selection (a higher  causes  to fall), agglomeration, via
selection, can generate productivity gains. Nevertheless, the way in which the key parameters
summarized in  (e.g.,  and ) determine selection cutoﬀ aﬀects the magnitude of the
productivity gains realized by agglomeration via selection. On the one hand, (20) implies
that the larger  is, the larger the productivity gains from increasing . On the other hand,
given , a larger  also means less selective firm entry and fewer productivity gains to drive
agglomeration. Therefore, there is a potential non-monotonic relationship between  and
agglomeration, as we show in Section 5.
Remark 1. The foregoing cutoﬀ formula is applicable only to the interior case, where
   for both  It is possible that  =  for one country  even when  is assumed
to be large, because when  → 0,  goes to infinity, and so  must hit the upper bound
for a suﬃciently small , such that

 ≥
¡
1 + −¢2
2 ( + 1) ( + 2)  (22)
In other words, when the number of final goods firms in country  is excessively small, this
small market size attracts only a small number of entrants; hence, all entrants can survive.
By (19), when the cutoﬀ in one country  hits the upper bound ( = ), the selection
cutoﬀ in the other country  6=  is given by¡¢+2 =   +2  (23)
In general, we assume  to be large to ensure that cases in which the cutoﬀ hits the
upper bound are confined to extremely uneven distributions of skilled labor. Note that
when survival in one country  becomes a certainty ( = ), the other country’s selection
pressure becomes more responsive to increases in market size. In other words, the selection
cutoﬀ given by (23) is smaller than that given by (20) when (22) holds.
11
4.3 Labor Market and Locational Equilibrium
Because each skilled worker owns a final goods firm and each final goods firm hires a mass 1
of unskilled workers, the total unskilled labor demand is given by 1. The labor market
clearing condition is then
1 =  (24)
This, together with (5) and (14), pins down the equilibrium market wage to
 = 


 ln ()− ln ¡¢− 

∙
2
+
( + 1) 
2 ( + 2)
¸
 (25)
Because skilled workers are mobile, the equilibrium location choice of a final goods firm
must satisfy the following locational equilibrium condition.
 =  for  = , whenever  ∈ (0 1)  (26)
That is, for an interior distribution, skilled workers’ value must be equalized across countries.
An extreme distribution,  = 1 ( = 0), is also an equilibrium if  ≥ .
4.4 World Equilibrium
We are now ready to define the world equilibrium.
Definition. A world equilibrium is a list of quantities {1 1()    }, prices {()
 }, cutoﬀs © ª, and population distribution {} for  =  and  ⊆ £0  ¤, such
that both final and intermediate goods firms all optimize (inclusive of the final goods firms’
locational choice), the zero cutoﬀ profit and free entry conditions are met, labor markets clear,
the locational equilibrium for final goods firms is reached, and population identity (3) holds.
5 Equilibrium Characterization
There are two world equilibrium configurations: a symmetric configuration with  = 12
and an agglomeration configuration with  6= 12. Because the two countries in our model
are symmetric, we can, without loss of generality, restrict our attention to the case with
 ≥ . It is convenient to denote the utility diﬀerence of skilled managers between two
countries as ∆ ≡  −  and their distribution as  ≡  and  = 1 − . Note that if
∆  0 then  will increase unless  = 1. Similarly, if ∆  0 then  will decrease unless
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 = 0. Thus, an equilibrium is ∆ = 0 at any  ∈ [0 1]  ∆  0 at  = 1, or ∆  0 at
 = 0 Following the convention proposed by Benabou (1996), we define the stability of a
world equilibrium as follows, focusing on the case with  ≥ 1
2
(i.e.,  ≥ ). Any world
equilibrium with  ∈ [12 1) is said to be stable if ∆ ≤ 0. A world equilibrium with
∆  0 at  = 1 is also stable, and a world equilibrium with ∆ = 0 at  = 1 is stable if
∆ ≥ 0.
Recall that we impose the condition that    and consider a suﬃciently large  . We
first show the following.
Theorem 1 (World Equilibrium). A symmetric world equilibrium always exists, in which
the zero profit cutoﬀ is interior (i.e.,    for  = ). Moreover, if the symmetric
world equilibrium is unstable, then at least one agglomeration world equilibrium exists, and
almost surely at least one of them is stable.
Proof. All proofs are relegated to the appendix. ¥
This is an important theorem as it reduces analysis of the equilibrium configuration simply to
establishing the conditions under which the symmetric world equilibrium is unstable. In this
case, an agglomeration world equilibrium will arise. Almost surely, at least one agglomeration
equilibrium is stable; that is, the subset of parameter space under which all agglomeration
equilibria are unstable is of measure zero.
To establish such conditions, we observe that  =  and  = −,
implying that ∆
 = 
 + 
Accordingly, we focus on evaluating ∆ |=12, which depends crucially on the cutoﬀ parame-
ter  and unskilled labor force parameter  ≡ |=12 = ln ¡2 ¢  ln(2)  0. It is convenient
to define the following functions.
Φ () ≡ 22 − ( − 2) − 2 ( + 1)
Λ () ≡ −2 1+2−2+3+2 £(2 + 3)2 + (2 + 2) +  + 1¤
Ψ ( ) ≡ − ( + 2)2 − 1+2 − 2 2+2 ( + 1)−1 1+2− 3+4+2 Φ ()
Ω () ≡ −2 ( + 2) ( + 1) 12  12Φ () 12 + (2 + 3)2 + (2 + 2) +  + 1 for Φ ()  0
˜ () ≡ [ ( + 2)]
+2
2
(
3+4
[( + 1)Φ ()]+2
)12
for Φ ()  0
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The following lemmas are helpful in establishing the aforementioned conditions.
Lemma 1. ∆ |=12  0 if and only if Ψ ( )  Λ ().
Lemma 2. For all  ≥ 1, there exists a ˜ ≡ 1
4
h
( − 2) + (2 + 12 + 20)12
i
 ln (2) such
that Φ ()  0 for all   ˜ and Φ ()  0 for all   ˜.
Lemma 3. For all   ˜, Ψ()  0; for   ˜, Ψ()  0 if   ˜ () and Ψ()  0 if
  ˜ ().
Lemma 4. Ψ
³
˜ ()  
´
 Λ () if and only if Ω ()  0.
We are now ready to establish the main theorem of the paper.
Theorem 2 (Agglomeration Equilibrium).
Case 1: If   ˜, then there exists at least one agglomeration world equilibrium with a
suﬃciently large .
Case 2: If   ˜ and
(a) if Ω ()  0, then there exists at least one agglomeration world equilibrium with
intermediate  in the neighborhood ˜() of ˜ ();
(b) if Ω ()  0, then the symmetric world equilibrium is stable.
Almost surely, at least one of the agglomeration equilibria arising in Cases 1 and 2(a) is
stable.
This theorem is important as it states that a stable agglomeration world equilibrium can
arise under the conditions given in Cases 1 and 2(a).
Remark 2. Notably, when a symmetric equilibrium is unstable, at least one agglomeration
equilibrium exists. When a symmetric equilibrium is stable, there may or may not be an
agglomeration equilibrium, but there is definitely no agglomeration equilibrium in the neigh-
borhood of  = 12.4 It is in this sense that the conditions established in Theorem 2 are
suﬃcient but not necessary for agglomeration equilibrium.
4As we show in Section 6, there is a case in which the symmetric equilibrium is stable, but there also
exists a stable agglomeration equilibrium.
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To understand the conditions established in Theorem 2, recall that  ≡ ln ¡2 ¢ is posi-
tively dependent on the unskilled labor force , and  ≡ 2(+1)(+2)( )
(1+−) on transport cost and the strength of the variety eﬀect . Therefore, for a suﬃciently small unskilled labor
force such that   ˜, a stable agglomeration world equilibrium arises when the transport
cost and strength of the variety eﬀect are suﬃciently high. On the contrary, for a suﬃciently
large unskilled labor force such that   ˜ and Ω ()  0, a stable agglomeration world equi-
librium arises when the transport cost and the strength of the variety eﬀect take intermediate
values.
To better understand the intuition, we investigate three key channels underlying the
aforementioned findings by reexamining ∆ |=12 = 2 

 |=12, where

 =


µ
 +




¶
+



  (27)
>From (15), we know that the term  is clearly negative, which means that more
stringent selection in the intermediate goods sector is always beneficial to final goods firms
because the input prices are lower. Therefore, the absolute value of this term measures
the marginal gains of selection. From (27), we know that such gains can arise from two
channels: one that captures the direct market size eﬀect on selection (i.e., 
 ) and
another that represents the (intermediate goods-unskilled labor) complementarity eﬀect on
selection (i.e., 


 ). From (20), it is clear that an increase in  reduces the cutoﬀ and
renders the selection tougher, which, in turn, raises the profit accruing to skilled workers,
thereby encouraging agglomeration. Focusing now on the complementarity eﬀect, we can
see that an increase in  reduces the amount of labor hired by each firm, , and, by the
complementarity eﬀect, decreases the demand for intermediate goods and hence the cutoﬀ.
Again, as  decreases,  increases, which also encourages agglomeration.
There is, however, a direct labor force eﬀect via the second term on the right-hand side of
(27). More specifically, as an increase in  reduces the amount of labor hired by each firm,
, the final goods production per firm is reduced, and wages rise. That   0 i.e., the
profit per firm  is reduced with a decrease in  is evident from (15). Thus, the direct labor
force eﬀect is a channel that discourages agglomeration. In sum, the sign of  obviously
constitutes a tug-of-war between the direct labor force eﬀect and the sum of the two selection
eﬀects. When the two selection eﬀects dominate, an agglomeration world equilibrium arises.
We now investigate how the magnitude of these three channels depends on the cutoﬀ and
unskilled labor force parameters,  and . As shown in the appendix, the magnitude of the
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two selection eﬀects is given by




=
⎧
⎨
⎩

h
(2 + 3)− ¡¢−1i− 2 ( + 1) h¡¢−1 + ¡¢−2i 
2 ( + 2)
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎧
⎨
⎩
2
 + 2
¡¢ 1+2
()+3+2
⎫
⎬
⎭ (28)
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
2 £(2+3) --1¤ -2+3+2 (+1)³- +1+2+- 2+3+2 ´  1+2
2 (+2)
⎫
⎬
⎭
(
2-
1
+2
+2 ()
1
+2
)
 (29)
where the first and second terms on the right-hand side are the absolute values of 
and  respectively.
Moreover,

 =
2 − 1+2
n

¡¢−2 + ( + 1) ¡¢2 h2 ¡¢−3 + ¡¢−2io
2 (30)
=
2 − 1+2
h
2
1
+2− 2+3+2  1+2 + 2 2+2 ( + 1)
³
2−3+4+2 + − 2+2+2
´
 2+2
i
2  (31)
It is clear that the larger  is, the smaller the negative labor force eﬀect and the more
likely that agglomeration will be the equilibrium outcome. However, the eﬀect of  on the
two selection eﬀects is generally ambiguous, as ¯¯¯¯ is larger with a larger  whereas¯¯ ¯¯ is smaller. The non-monotonic eﬀect of  on agglomeration in Case 2(a) of Theorem
2 is driven mainly by its ambiguous eﬀect via the selection channel, as noted in Section 4.2.
Further examination of (29) shows that when  is small, the profit is less sensitive to the
cutoﬀ (i.e., ¯¯ ¯¯ is smaller) and the magnitude of the change in the cutoﬀ in response
to  is smaller (i.e., ¯¯¯¯ is smaller). In other words, when  is suﬃciently small, the
selection eﬀects become less important, and the dominant direct labor force eﬀect leads to a
positive eﬀect of  on agglomeration. When  is large, in contrast, the selection eﬀects are
important, and the eﬀect of  on agglomeration becomes non-monotonic. Intuitively, when 
is small, complementarity implies that the marginal product of intermediate goods is small,
and hence the selection channel is unimportant.
Drawing on the foregoing arguments and the cutoﬀ pinned down by (20), we are now
ready to evaluate the eﬀects of trade liberalization on agglomeration and firm selection. The
results are summarized in the following two propositions.
Proposition 1 (Trade and Agglomeration). For either a suﬃciently small or suﬃciently
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large unskilled labor force with an initially low trade cost, trade liberalization induces disper-
sion.
Proposition 2 (Trade and Firm Selection). When trade liberalization induces agglomeration,
it leads to tougher firm selection and improves average productivity. When trade liberalization
induces dispersion, its eﬀects on firm selection and average productivity become ambiguous.
Trade liberalization is captured in our model by a decrease in  , which means that  also
decreases. With a small unskilled labor force (a small ), a large and dominant direct labor
force eﬀect implies that trade liberalization can create dispersion rather than agglomeration.
With a large unskilled labor force, trade liberalization can also lead to dispersion if we have
a suﬃciently small  to begin with. This result is contrary to the general prediction of
core-periphery models. Intermediate goods-unskilled labor complementarity with unskilled
labor kept immobile is reminiscent of the model proposed by Helpman (1998), which employs
immobile land as the dispersion force. However, the trade cost in Helpman’s model has an
unambiguous eﬀect on agglomeration: as  decreases, dispersion becomes more likely. Our
model, in contrast, features diﬀerent comparative statics and is dependent on the way in which
complementarity kicks in. Another closely related model of agglomeration is that proposed
by Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2010), which likewise adopts the selection structure of Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008). However, it does not have the non-monotonic comparative statics on
agglomeration that this paper does. In Behrens and Robert-Nicoud a reduction in the trade
cost always encourages agglomeration. Moreover, our prediction diﬀers from the findings
of Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) and Peng, Thisse, and Wang (2006), in which
firms are homogeneous, and hence there is no selection eﬀect. The former paper employs a
quadratic utility function, where a reduction in the final goods trade cost always encourages
agglomeration. The latter uses a quadratic final goods production function, where trade
liberalization eﬀected by lowering intermediate goods trade cost discourages agglomeration
which resembles Case 1 in this paper with a suﬃciently small unskilled labor force, and hence
less influential selection eﬀects.
>From cutoﬀ expression (20), it is clear that the direct eﬀect of trade liberalization is
to lower the marginal-cost cutoﬀ, thus resulting in a tougher firm selection as in Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008). In contrast with their model, however, we have endogenous entry
eﬀects via the intermediate goods-unskilled labor complementarity and final goods producers’
locational choice, which are captured by  and , respectively, in (20). In the case in which
trade liberalization induces agglomeration, both of these endogenous entry eﬀects turn out to
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be negative, and firm selection becomes tougher, thus reinforcing the direct eﬀect. In the case
in which trade liberalization induces dispersion, the two channels of endogenous entry eﬀects
ease firm selection. If these channels dominate the direct eﬀect, then trade liberalization can
ease firm selection and cause average productivity to fall.
6 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we examine the agglomeration equilibria in the diﬀerent cases discussed
in the previous section numerically. We show that the set of agglomeration equilibrium
configurations in this model is a superset of the canonical models in the literature, e.g.,
Krugman (1991), Helpman (1998), and Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002).
As noted in Remark 1, caution must be exercised in examining the case in which the
cutoﬀ hits the upper bound in one of the two countries. Recall that when  is close to 0
 goes to infinity. Hence, in the neighborhood of 0  =  , and the selection cutoﬀ  is
determined by (23). In this case, the selection pressure on country  6=  becomes extremely
strong because the other location ceases to be a buﬀer. The absence of selection in country
 brings a non-smooth change to the curve of ∆, the key indicator of the incentive, or lack
thereof, to move toward country A. Imagine that  is rather small such that the selection
cutoﬀ in country B hits the upper bound. The selection pressure then becomes extreme
in country A, but this brings out the best in country A’s intermediate goods firms, and
the resulting significant productivity gains move the profit diﬀerence in favor of country A.
However, when  moves closer to 0, the super-abundant labor force in country B eventually
becomes attractive, which works in country B’s favor. Depending on the parameters, we
will occasionally observe huge swings in the ∆ curve in this neighborhood, possibly creating
additional agglomeration equilibria. Although there may be interesting economics underlying
such huge swings, the possibility of them occurring hinges on the fact that there is an upper
bound for the cost distribution or, equivalently, a positive lower bound for the productivity
distribution. Thus, it does not constitute a general property that would apply to unbounded
distributions, such as the log-normal distribution. To rule out these artificial equilibria, we
focus on the ∆ curve within the range of  such that both countries have interior cutoﬀs
lower than  . More specifically, we show all of the numerical plots of ∆ in Figures 1 to 8
over  ∈ [01 09], within which nonrobust artificial equilibria fail to arise.
First look at Case 1. Recall that in this case,  is relatively small, and the symmetric
equilibrium is unstable when  is suﬃciently large, and stable otherwise. By fixing the other
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parameters,5 Figure 1 shows that the symmetric equilibrium is stable under  = 15, and the
∆ curve is strictly decreasing, meaning that there is no other equilibrium within the range
of [01 09]. In Figure 2, under  = 10, the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable and
∆  0 at  = 09 and ∆  0 at  = 01, which indicates that both 01 and 09 are stable
agglomeration equilibrium.
We next look at Case 2(b). In Figure 3, the symmetric equilibrium is stable, and no
other equilibrium exists, which is similar to Figure 1 and consistent with the analytical
results.6 For Case 2(a), with the other parameters fixed,7 we begin from a rather small
 with  = 05 (Ψ ( )  Λ ()) In Figure 4, the symmetric equilibrium is stable and
is the only equilibrium. In Figure 5,  is increased to 15 (still Ψ ( )  Λ ()), and
the symmetric equilibrium remains stable. However, there are two unstable and two stable
agglomeration equilibria. In Figure 6,  is further increased to 5 (Ψ ( )  Λ ()), and the
symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable, and there are two stable agglomeration equilibria
within the range of  ∈ (01 09). In Figure 7, where  = 25 (still Ψ ( )  Λ ()), although
the symmetric equilibrium remains unstable, there are also interior agglomeration equilibria.
Finally in Figure 8, where  = 30 (now Ψ ( )  Λ ()), the symmetric equilibrium becomes
stable and is the only equilibrium.
The patterns that appear in Cases 1 and 2(b) confirm our earlier analytical results. These
patterns are also seen in Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) and Helpman (1998) when
the agglomeration forces are rather weak (Case 1 with a small  and Case 2(b)) or rather
strong (Case 1 with a large ). In Figures 4 to 8, we observe a transition in the patterns
from a small  to increasingly large ’s. When  is either very small or very large (Figures
4 and 8, respectively), the agglomeration forces are rather weak, and we observe a pattern
similar to those in Figures 1 and 3. Surprisingly, however, for the middle values of , the
patterns reveal phenomena that cannot be predicted from local stability analysis at  =
12. In Figure 5, although Ψ ( )  Λ () and the symmetric equilibrium remains stable,
agglomeration equilibria show up when the degree of agglomeration is strong. Thus, at a
medium range, agglomeration itself becomes an agglomeration force. This pattern shows up
5In addition to   the other parameters are  = 10  = 1  = 5  = 12 ¯ = 001 ( = 100)  = 2
 = 002 and  = 1
6The parameters are  = 10  = 1  = 5  = 200 ¯ = 001 ( = 100)  = 2  = 20  = 1 and
 = 15. In this case,  = 438
7In addition to  the other parameters are  = 10  = 1  = 5  = 1000 ¯ = 001 ( = 100)  = 2
 = 15 and  = 1 In this case,  = 599
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in Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999), but not in Helpman (1998). In Figure 6 where
Ψ ( )  Λ (), we observe the same pattern as that in Figure 2. In Figure 7, however, where
we still have Ψ ( )  Λ (), we observe a pattern opposite to that in Figure 5. Interestingly,
this pattern appears in Helpman (1998), but not in Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999).
What causes the diﬀerence between Figures 5 and 7? Case 2(a) is basically an interme-
diate case in which various scenarios may occur. With a small  and a large  Theorem
2 indicates that the positive channels of agglomeration cannot be excessively large. Thus,
given moderate marginal gains of selection
¯¯ ¯¯, the symmetric equilibrium is stable
at  = 12 However, the marginal gains of selection change along with the market size, as
it is evident from (28) that a larger  implies tougher selection, which, in turn, enlarges¯¯ ¯¯ and thus produces the upswing in Figure 5. With a large  the selection cutoﬀ is
large to begin with. Equation (30) indicates that the negative impact of tight labor demand
due to agglomeration is stronger with a higher selection cutoﬀ . In other words, the lower
marginal product of intermediate goods induced by agglomeration (via a lower ) renders
the low productivity of intermediate good inputs (i.e., a high  and ) more detrimental,
thus producing the downswing shown in Figure 7. Although Figures 5 and 7 have similar
counterparts in the extant literature, their underlying economics diﬀer. Moreover, this paper
may constitute the first time for both of these patterns to be shown in one model.
7 Concluding Remarks
We here construct a model of intermediate goods trade and industrial agglomeration fea-
turing labor-input complementarity and intermediate firm selection. We show that trade
liberalization’s eﬀect on industrial agglomeration may be non-monotonic. In a highly com-
petitive world market in which intermediate firm selection is important, such as that faced by
the newly developed Asian Tigers, will governments always be in favor of liberalizing trade
if industrial hollowing-out is a major concern? Notably, all of these economies trade with
several much larger economies. Suppose that the trade cost is initially low (as it was in Hong
Kong and Taiwan). Then, further trade liberalization can exert a dispersion force that slows
down the hollowing-out of domestic final goods firms. Suppose instead that the trade cost is
initially moderately high. Then, a strategic slowdown in trade liberalization may be required
to prevent hollowing-out.
Along these lines, there are at least two interesting avenues for future work. One would
be to calibrate the model presented herein, following the strategies developed by Yi (2003),
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to two representative economies to explain the diﬀerent patterns of agglomeration and trade.
Another would be to consider firm entry dynamics, following Luttmer (2007). However, the
endogenous locational choice of final goods producers in our model means that we must
also incorporate migration dynamics, which would lead to additional complexity. Further
simplification of the model is thus required before this further analysis can be carried out.
Although these extensions are potentially valuable, they are beyond the scope of this work.
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A. Derivation of Intermediate Goods Aggregator under Autarky
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B. Derivation of Skilled Worker Value
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which is (15). Upon substituting in the cutoﬀ expression (20), we have (21). Further manip-
ulation gives us
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which is used to derive the results in Section 5.
C. Derivation of Free Entry Condition
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D. Proof of Theorem 1: The first part of the theorem can be easily shown by guess-
and-verify. By symmetry,  =  = 1
2
. Thus, both the locational choice and locational
equilibrium conditions are met. From (20), we know that the cutoﬀ  must be the same
across countries. It is also clear that, with  =  = 12, there must exist a suﬃciently large
 such that the cutoﬀs are interior. To show the second part, we apply standard continuity
arguments. More specifically, ∆  0 at  = 12 implies that at least some portion
of the ∆ curve on [12 1] is positive. If this portion extends to the entire domain [12 1)
then ∆ ≥ 0 at  = 1, and we get a full agglomeration equilibrium, which will be stable if
∆  0 If this portion does not extend to the entire domain, then continuity implies that
∆ = 0 at least once at an interior  the smallest of which must be a stable agglomeration
equilibrium. The only case in which there is no stable agglomeration equilibrium is that in
which the positive portion of the ∆ curve extends to the entire domain [12 1), ∆ = 0,
and ∆  0 at  = 1. However, continuity implies that the subset of the parameter
space necessary for this scenario to occur is of zero measure relative to the entire parameter
space.¥
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E. Proof of Lemma 1: Taking the derivative of  with respect to  and using (21), we
obtain
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Evaluating it at  = 12, we obtain
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which is positive if and only if Ψ ( )  Λ (). ¥
F. Proof of Lemma 2: If Φ (ln (2))  0 then the inequalities are trivial based on the
observation that ˜ is the positive root of the quadratic equation Φ () = 0. Note that because
 ≥ 1 Φ (ln (2)) = 2 [ln (2)]2− [ln (2) + 2]+2 ln (2)−2≤ 2 [ln (2)]2−[ln (2) + 2]+2 ln (2)−2 
0. ¥
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G. Proof of Lemma 3: Straightforward diﬀerentiation yields
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which is positive if Φ ()  0. When Φ ()  0, Ψ () first increases from −∞ to a peak and
then decreases to −∞, and so Ψ() is positive for small  values and negative for large 
values. Solving Ψ() = 0 yields the root ˜ (). The result follows immediately by utilizing
Lemma 2. ¥
H. Proof of Lemma 4: Plugging ˜ () into Ψ ( ), we obtain
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Straightforward manipulation gives us Ψ
³
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´
 Λ if and only if Ω ()  0. ¥
I. Proof of Theorem 2: For Case 1, if   ˜, then by Lemma 3, Ψ()  0 and, for
suﬃciently large  values, Ψ ( )  Λ (). Lemma 1 implies that in this case the symmetric
world equilibrium must be unstable. By Theorem 1, there must exist an agglomeration world
equilibrium that almost surely is stable. For Case 2(a), with Ω ()  0, Lemma 4 implies
that Ψ
³
˜ ()  
´
 Λ (). Thus, by continuity, there must be a neighborhood ˜() of ˜ ()
such that for all  ∈ ˜(), Ψ ( )  Λ (). Similar arguments suggest that there must
exist a stable agglomeration world equilibrium. However, with Ω ()  0 as in Case 2(b),
Ψ
³
˜ ()  
´
 Λ (). Thus, for all , Ψ ( )  Λ (), which implies that the symmetric
world equilibrium is always stable. ¥
J. Derivation of Decomposed Channels:
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 ¡ − 1¢− ( + 1) ¡ + 1¢ 
( + 2) 
#
25
=
1
2
⎡
⎣

h
(2 + 3)− ¡¢−1i
 + 2 −
2 ( + 1)
h¡¢−1 + ¡¢−2i 
 + 2
⎤
⎦
=
1
2
⎡
⎢⎣

h
(2 + 3)− ¡¢−1i
 + 2 −
2 ( + 1)
h¡¢−+1+2 + ¡¢− 2+3+2 i
 + 2
µ 

¶ 1+2⎤⎥⎦ 
which can be evaluated at  = 12 to yield¯¯¯¯ 

¯¯¯¯
=
1
2 ( + 2)
h
 £(2 + 3)− −1¤− 2+3+2 ( + 1)³−+1+2 + − 2+3+2 ´  1+2i 
Moreover, at  = 12, ¯¯¯¯

¯¯¯¯
=
2
 + 2
¡¢ 1+2
()+3+2 =
2−
1
+2
 + 2 ()
1
+2 ,
which can be substituted into the previous expression to obtain (29). Furthermore, at  =
12,

 =


µ-
2
¶"
 ¡-1¢ -(+1) ¡+1¢ 
( + 2) 
#
+
-
2


"
 ¡-1¢ -(+1) ¡+1¢ 
( + 2) 
#
=

¡¢−2
2
⎡
⎣ ¡-1¢ -(+1)
³
1+
¡¢−1´ 
 + 2
⎤
⎦+ -

¡¢−1
2
"
+(+1) 

¡¢−2
 + 2
#
=
1
2
⎧
⎨
⎩
2 −

¡¢−2 + ( + 1) ¡¢2 h2 ¡¢−3 + ¡¢−2i
 + 2
⎫
⎬
⎭ 
thus leading to (31). ¥
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Figure 1: Case 1 under  = 15 Figure 2: Case 1 under  = 10
Figure 3: Case 2(b) Figure 4: Case 2(a),  = 05
Figure 5: Case 2(a),  = 15 Figure 6: Case 2(a),  = 5
Figure 7: Case 2(a),  = 25 Figure 8: Case 2(a),  = 30
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